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Abstract 
Paper I: Strategic Carbon Taxation and Energy Pricing: The Role of Innovation 
This paper uses a dynamic game to investigate the strategic interactions between carbon taxation 
by a coalition of resource consumers and (wellhead) energy pricing by a producers’ cartel under 
the possibility of innovation in a cheap carbon-free technology. The timing of innovation is 
uncertain, but can be affected by the amount spent on R&D. The results show that the expectation 
of possible innovation decreases both the initial carbon tax and producer price, resulting in higher 
initial resource extraction and carbon emissions. Though this ‘green paradox’ effect triggered by 
possible innovation also will appear in the cooperative case (without strategic interactions), the 
presence of strategic interactions between resource producers and consumers can somewhat 
restrain such an effect. For both the resource consumers and a global planner, the optimal R&D to 
stimulate innovation is an increasing function of the initial CO2 concentration. However, the 
resource consumers can over-invest in R&D relative to the investment level that a global planner 
would choose. 
Paper II: The Harrington Paradox Squared 
Harrington (1988) shows that state-dependent enforcement based on past compliance records 
provides an explanation to the seemingly contradictory observation that firms’ compliance with 
environmental regulations is high despite the fact that inspections occur infrequently and fines are 
rare and small. This result has been labeled in the literature as the “Harrington paradox.” In this 
paper, we propose an improved transition structure for the audit framework, in which targeting is 
based not only on firms’ past compliance record but also on adoption of environ- mentally 
superior technologies. We show that this transition structure would not only foster the adoption of 
new technology but also increase deterrence by changing the composition of firms in the industry 
toward an increased fraction of cleaner firms that pollute and violate less. 
Paper III: The Benefits of International Cooperation under Climate Uncertainty: A 
Dynamic Game Analysis 
This paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global 
warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the 
case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players' combined expected 
payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, 
the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more 
important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be 
needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players. 
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